

**St. Louis County, Missouri
Police Department**

TACTICAL OPERATIONS
(SWAT)



This document covers the establishment and expansion of the special unit within the St. Louis County, MO Police Department that responds to acts of civil disorder, hostage situations, negotiations, armed and barricaded suspects, acts of terrorism, execution of high-risk search warrants, dignitary protection, high-risk assignments, and other special or unusual events.

Prepared by:

Colonel Jon M. Belmar, Chief of Police
Gil Kleinknecht (Retired), Historian

Contributions by:

Tactical Officer J. Sparks
Research Associate Dave Jones

February 14, 2016

“One thing is sure. We have to do something. We have to do the best we know how at the moment... If it doesn’t turn out right, we can modify it as we go along.”

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Background

The purpose of this history document is to record how and why the St. Louis County, MO Police Department (County Police) accepted the challenge and prepared for a new phenomenon facing local law enforcement agencies: acts of civil disorder resulting in property damage and personal injuries, terrorism, attacks by gunmen inside our schools and universities, etc. The reader will understand how a specialized unit gradually converted from a mission of managing civil disorders using military-style tactics to a team of highly trained and equipped tactical officers who respond to a diversified set of missions.

Starting in the early 1960s the federal government, as well as state and local law enforcement agencies began planning for a response to the increasing number of civil disorder incidents occurring across the nation. Two examples are the riots that occurred following the death of Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. as well as those on the college and university campuses. Both federal and state agencies began to offer training courses for local police officers in the area of crowd control and responding to civil disorder based on tactics used by the U.S. military and National Guard units. At the same time local police agencies were receiving federal grants and other revenue sharing to assist with the purchase of protective equipment for police officers when responding to incidents of civil disorder.

During this same period, law enforcement agencies at all levels of government were also collecting and sharing intelligence on why acts of civil disorder and riots were occurring. To assist the local police in preparing plans and tactics for responding to civil disorder, the FBI issued in February 1965 a comprehensive manual for the *“Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots.”* This manual was used for several years by local police officials as a meaningful guide. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967, studied extensively the civil disorder problems in large cities and offered recommendations for improving the situation, including several that transformed the tactics used by state and local police agencies. All the various studies and commission reports concluded that the local police agencies were the first line of defense, or the first responders. Therefore, training and equipment necessary for the local police agencies to preserve the peace or restore order was required. The National Guard units, based on Missouri State regulations, could only assist when a local government executive/police official requested assistance after determining he/she had lost control of the situation.



First Tactical Operations Seal

History of Tactical Operations

Over the past 50 years the County Police has pursued more than one approach to organize, train and equip police officers to safely and effectively respond to incidents of civil disorder and other life threatening or dangerous situations. Starting in the early 1960s, as a member of the area Code 1000 Plan, the County Police purchased emergency equipment such as protective helmets and gas masks and participated in training programs on controlling riots and civil disorder. At the same time liaison was established with the Missouri National Guard for a situation where the local police/governments were unable to manage the enormity of the riot or disturbance. This liaison established procedures for requesting intervention by the National Guard.

The following sections summarize the different initiatives by the County Police since 1968 to establish a tactical unit. This history includes the several mission changes that were necessary at the time to accommodate new threats facing the community.

Tactical Unit - 1968-1972: The first reference to the County Police establishing a tactical team came in 1968 when Superintendent Raymond W. Hensley noted in his annual report to the community that *"after reviewing the monthly report ... it was decided to establish a special unit, known as the Tactical Unit, which could be utilized in areas of high burglary crimes ... in an attempt to offset this criminal activity."* To assist the new tactical unit when responding to other emergencies such as a *"riot or rebellion, 29 armored vehicles were made available by the Brinks Armored Car Service."* However, the drivers of the armored cars had to be police officers with the Brinks name and logos covered with police department signs. To house persons arrested as a result of a mass demonstration, the St. Louis County Jail Administrator, Mr. George Hanson, agreed to make arrangements with a local fencing company to have emergency crews standing by (day and night) to install fences in a county park to serve as a stockade. Tennis courts would be used for prisoner confinement until the stockade(s) could be erected.



1968 Tactical Equipment

Based on federal funding available from the newly passed Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the County Police requested in April 1968 the sum of \$18,635 (less 25% for a local match) to make the department more effective in the prevention, detection and control of riots and civil disorder. During this period the department required all command and supervisory officers and 22 patrolmen to attend a "tear gas" seminar. The below table provides a list of the basic items of equipment that were purchased using federal funds, to include a sufficient supply of tear gas and gas masks:

24 - Liners for Military Helmets, \$0.85 ea.	100 - 36" Batons, \$4 ea.
25 - Remington Model 870 Shotguns, \$77 ea.	200 - Gas Canisters, \$5 ea.
100 - Lake Erie Gas Masks, \$37 ea.	1 - Three-Channel Mobile Radio, \$1,200
12 - Walkie-Talkies, \$800 ea.	1 - Polaroid Camera, \$172

In an August 31, 1970 memorandum the County Police made mention of the first trained and equipped tactical response squads capable of responding to civil disorder incidents. The memo reported that "*Victor Tactical Squad Unit*" was scheduled for refresher training that included advanced stick or baton handling as well as a demonstration of a new innovation – the use of a canvas shield to protect officers against rocks and bottles when responding to a disturbance. The unit was under the command of Sergeant H. Hodges.

There is no evidence or records available to show that this unit ever materialized into a fully trained, equipped and effective tactical unit.

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams - 1972-1973: By May 1972, there were reports that the tactical unit established two years earlier had apparently fallen into "*complete disuse*." As a result, Major M. Bergauer, Commander of Field Operations, was directed by Superintendent R. di Grazia to prepare a plan to reestablish tactical teams due to the "*difficulties that might arise during the summer months of 1972*." Apparently, there were concerns about possible disturbances that would follow school closings and the warm summer weather. The vintage reports reveal that since 1969 the number of disturbances had increased each year, especially in the Wellston/Hillsdale area. The need for a specifically selected, equipped and trained group of police officers for this purpose was also based on the "*increasing number of sniper and similar incidents {that had been} occurring throughout the nation*." There is another report that suggested Superintendent di Grazia wanted tactical teams established in anticipation of civil unrest in the Ferguson-Florissant-School District due to the issue of busing students across district boundaries.

The Bergauer plan recommended the establishment of six teams to be known as the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. The primary mission of the teams was to provide "*close-range assault firepower against barricaded suspects for fortified position (and) ... team defense*." Each team would consist of six members, for a total commitment of 30 district patrol officers and six lieutenants. In addition, each district lieutenant was to receive specialized training to assume, as a collateral duty, the position of SWAT team commander. The plan also required the officers selected to remain in their district patrol assignments as SWAT was considered a secondary or collateral duty. Selection of the team members was based on two requirements. First, the officer selected had to agree the assignment was on a "*strictly voluntary basis*." Second, the officer had to have prior training in the use of high velocity weapons.

Following approval of a November 1970 federal grant in the amount of \$9,054, the County Police requested matching funds (budget supplement) from St. Louis County Council to purchase "*riot guns, gas masks, walkie talkies, roof mounted spotlights, four-channel mobile radios, and fogging and tear gas equipment*." This request for specialized equipment followed the May 1970 Washington University campus disturbances and arson fire that destroyed two buildings. The other equipment/supplies requested included extra ammunition, weapons, tear gas/gas-projectile guns, forced entry equipment (battering rams and pry bars), protective armor, binoculars, loud speakers, rappelling equipment and medical supplies. In order to transport the specialized equipment and supplies to the scene of an emergency, the Bergauer plan also recommended the purchase of a large step-van. Equipped with telephone and radio equipment, the van would also function as a SWAT command post and was large enough to transport two fully equipped SWAT teams.

During the 1970s the need for anti-sniper teams to protect members of the public and police officers was being addressed by other state and local police departments. The success of the Los Angeles, CA Police Department provided a model for other departments, including the County Police, to consider when establishing a SWAT team. The FBI also provided valuable assistance by offering to local police special training seminars covering civil disorder issues and special weapons and tactics. For

example, in early 1972 the St. Louis FBI Field Office held a seminar at the Clayton Community Center on the subject of urban guerilla warfare.

As a member of the Code 1000 plan, the department in May 1972 participated in a mock exercise testing the administrative and operational issues associated with activating a Code 1000 call-out. District patrol officers were instructed to report to the assembly area in their riot control uniform, which consisted of a khaki shirt and pants, bringing along their .38 cal. revolver, handcuffs, nightstick and helmet. Other special equipment required for crowd control, such as gas masks, would be issued at the assembly area.

On June 26, 1972, Major Bergauer recommended 36 police officers to be appointed to the newly formed SWAT teams. The recommended list included six lieutenants and 30 patrolmen to be assigned to six teams. The district designations and lieutenants recommended were as follows:

<u>First District</u>	<u>Second District</u>
Able Platoon: Lt. R. Crews	Able Platoon: Lt. W. Gardner
Baker Platoon: Lt. R. Battelle	Baker Platoon: Lt. N. Land
Charlie Platoon: Lt. P. Clarke	Charlie Platoon: Lt. D. Long

The Bergauer plan also included an extensive list of specialized equipment to be issued to those police officers assigned to the proposed SWAT teams. The following is a brief description of the specialized, but limited equipment compared to the items issued today (2015):

Buckle Helmet with Visor	Dark Brown Two-Piece Utility Uniform w/ Yellow POLICE Letters on Back
Military Flap Holster, Web Belt w/ Web Belt Pouch	Small Name and Unit Patch On Right Breast of Utility Uniform
Acme Brand Gas Mask w/ Military Side Carrying Case	Brown Canvas Equipment Carrying Bag, 23 x 36"w/ Full Top Access
Military Style Side Carrying Case for Gas and Smoke Canisters	.38 cal. Service Revolver

It is apparent from an examination of the vintage files that Major Bergauer devoted considerable effort in organizing and staffing the proposed SWAT teams; however, there is no indication Superintendent di Grazia ever approved the plan or the officer assignments. Interviews with two of the lieutenants (Lt. R. Battelle and Lt. D. Long) who were recommended to lead a District SWAT Platoon confirmed this finding. Fortunately, the anticipated unrest or civil disorder never materialized in St. Louis County during the summer of 1972.

Bureau of Tactical Operations - 1973-1991: In 1968 the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) examined and reported the experience of eight U.S. cities in managing civil disturbances that occurred that year. This comprehensive document, *"Civil Disorders – After Action Reports,"* provides an analysis of the utilization of police command posts, deployment techniques, use of force policies and practices, tear gas for crowd control (CN/CS gas), etc. The report was prepared for the U.S. Attorney General; however, it was made available to local police departments as guidance when developing or revising training, staffing, and establishing operational SWAT teams.

With the benefit of the IACP and other after-action reports, as well as the experiences of state and local police, the County Police selected a *"best practice"* to implement – the establishment of a specialized unit, the Bureau of Tactical Operations. On August 5, 1973 The Board of Police

Commissioners approved this recommendation along with the realignment of other traditional police units. Initially, effective August 5, 1973 the bureau was under the command of Lieutenant R. Goodman who had been the supervisor of the disbanded Mobile Reserve Unit. One month later, effective September 25, at the same time police officers were selected for assignment to the bureau, Lieutenant J. Becker was designated as the director.

The new bureau established a dedicated group of police officers (tactical officers) trained and equipped to respond 24 hours per day to high risk emergencies and civil disorders. The 1973 mission statement included the following duties assigned to the new bureau:

- Render assistance to the divisions of Field Operations and Criminal Investigations.
- Provide security for government officials and other persons.
- Handle disturbances at correctional institutions, security within the courts or other government institutions.
- Assist the Bureau of Uniform Patrol in the handling of natural disasters or other major catastrophic situations.
- Serve as special weapons and tactics teams when dealing with snipers, barricaded persons who are armed and other riotous situations.
- Respond to all calls-for-service where the possibility of rapid response enhances the apprehension of offenders, e.g. in-progress robbery, rape, burglary, larceny, auto theft, aggravated assault, etc.).
- Respond to situations where a police officer is in need of assistance, provided they are strategically located so as to render meaningful and timely assistance to the requesting officer.



Bureau of Tactical Operations, 1975

The organizational chart was also amended in 1973 to provide for five separate patrol precincts, replacing the two patrol districts. Both the County Police and the St. Louis City Police Department had been using districts when referring to its patrol function. The establishment of precincts by the County Police removed the confusion as to which department was involved. For example, when a member of the public, or a police official, referred to the Second District everyone knew the reference was to the city of St. Louis. Precincts have been exclusively used by the County Police. With this change tactical officers were reassigned to each of the five County Police patrol precincts.

By January 1, 1974, after just five months of operation, the application, direction and supervision of the new Bureau of Tactical Operations was in need of clarification. Tactical officers assigned to the bureau would now receive their daily assignments only from the bureau director; or, in his absence, from the Executive Director of Field Operations. Previously, tactical officers had been distributed each day to the five precincts in support of patrol officers with crimes in progress (burglaries, robberies) and serious calls-for-assistance. The directive amending the duties of the bureau made special note that tactical officers would prepare their own police reports with regard to on-view incidents and would not call upon a patrol beat officer to prepare such reports. Nor would members of the bureau be assigned to a regular patrol beat on a fill basis or as a backup unit in high crime areas.

In just a few months of operation the day-to-day management and tactics used by the bureau began to evolve. Routine assignment of tactical officers to the five precincts for rapid response and suppression of crime, through quick apprehension, had not proven to be effective. In one of the evaluation reports prepared by Lt. Becker he expressed concern about lack of span of control for the bureau. The report also stated that the anticipated results had not been achieved due to the large size of each precinct. Based on this information, a change in the day-to-day direction and mission was approved on April 5, 1974. This change allowed the bureau to adopt the *"team policing concept"* thereby permitting selective enforcement (burglary, robbery and auto theft) in the unincorporated areas of St. Louis County. The revised mission included a requirement that the duty hours and days off for the tactical officers be changed to permit assignments to *"special problems"* when and where they occur.

The Bureau of Planning and Research was assigned to provide analytical support and direction to the new bureau in order to increase effectiveness in apprehending criminals as well as reducing the fear of crime in high crime areas. Using statistical data provided by automation (computers) and COGIS blocks (small geographic reporting areas), the research staff provided tactical officers with weekly maps and crime data for those areas where crime was highly concentrated. A 1974 deployment plan established *"Designated Patrol Zones"* along with a recommendation that tactical officers concentrate on the following high crime areas in north St. Louis County:

Parker Road east to Lewis and Clark Boulevard. Lewis and Clark Boulevard South to Chambers Road.
Chambers Road west to West Florissant Avenue. West Florissant Avenue north to Interstate 270. New Halls Ferry Road to Parker Road.

The Bureau of Planning and Research later determined that during a 14-week period the tactical officers had little impact on reducing the number of high fear crimes occurring within the designated patrol zones. The research also concluded that if the Bureau of Tactical Operations continued to utilize saturation patrols it was questionable if the potential impact would ever be achieved. As a result of this research conducted on reducing crime in designated patrol areas using saturation patrols, the mission for the bureau was modified once again. Less emphasis was placed on responding to major crimes-in-progress at the precinct level.

During this period when the County Police was establishing fully trained and equipped special weapons and tactics teams, the municipal police departments were experiencing similar concerns. Michael Broser, Chief of the Clayton, MO Police Department, reported that as of September 1974 only seven municipal police departments in the County had established SWAT teams (Brentwood, Clayton, Florissant, Hazelwood, Jennings, Kirkwood, and Webster Groves). Each municipality had one team consisting of five to eight police officers serving in a collateral duty capacity. The report released by Chief Broser, who was Chairman of the Code 1000 Committee, also noted that there was no uniformity of training or equipment among the municipal SWAT teams, nor had the coordination details been clearly established in case of a Code 1000 call out.

In order to equip all County police officers with the protective equipment necessary when responding to a civil disorder for crowd control, the department in December 1975 purchased 600 riot helmets and 600 M-17 surplus gas masks. This equipment was stored in the supply room at each precinct station in case of an emergency. However, protective helmets and gas masks issued to tactical officers were stored in the trunk of their personally assigned marked patrol vehicle.

By 1976 the staffing of the Bureau of Tactical Operations had expanded to one lieutenant, one sergeant and 17 police officers. During this period the first female police officer, C. L. Carter, was assigned to the bureau performing the same duties and responsibilities as the male tactical officers. Also, the monthly work schedule changed in order to provide two teams of four tactical officers each working the day watch (7:00 AM - 3:00 PM) and the same arrangement for the evening watch (6:00 PM - 2:00 AM). The day watch teams were subject to call back to duty between the hours 3:00 PM - 6:00 PM. The evening watch had the same call back from 2:00 AM - 6:00 AM.

Note: To learn more about the history of the female officers on the County Police see the report, *"Policewomen on Patrol,"* located on the County Police web site.



Bureau of Tactical Operations, 1980s

It was not until August 1977 that the department began to fully equip members of the bureau to handle “terrorists/kidnapping situations, barricaded subjects, and other SWAT missions.” In addition to the specialized equipment that would be necessary, there were three other issues that had to be resolved. These involved the need for trained police negotiators, psychiatric assistance at the scene to evaluate a suspect, and a special vehicle capable of delivering SWAT team members and equipment to the scene of the hazardous situation. A further request was to have at least one mobile telephone at the scene of each incident. Today, each tactical officer at the scene of an emergency is equipped with a cell phone and a portable radio. Note: This is just one illustration of how police tactical equipment has changed during the past 50 years.

As the number and complexity of the incidents assigned to the bureau increased, the County Police found it necessary in October 1983 to form a Tactical Operations Reserves. The purpose of the reserve unit was to assist with incidents that had (1) a long duration requiring relief of the regular tactical officers, (2) where a large number of tactical officers were required, or (3) where there was a simultaneous occurrence of multiple situations. Reserve members were selected from those police officers with prior experience with the bureau and who completed the annual tactical and firearms training.



During the 1980s the mission of the bureau continued to expand. The department’s 1990 annual report summarized this expansion by noting that the bureau was an intensely trained, highly skilled unit which responds to calls throughout St. Louis County, including requests from municipal police departments. This involved hostage situations, unusual events, armed and barricaded subjects, and search warrant execution and other high risk assignments or special events.

In December 1989, several of the larger municipal police departments accepted a recommendation that a “Civil Disturbance Response Team” be created and staffed with police officers from both the municipal police departments and the County Police. The establishment of a consolidated and trained unit would prepare the area police departments to handle future civil disorder incidents. During the same year the County Police merged the Bureau of Flight Operations (police helicopters) and the Bureau of Tactical Operations into one operational unit. The reason for this merger was to increase the

Tactical Equipment, 1985

capabilities of both units. Tactical officers could serve as helicopter observers and provide aerial command/direction during high-risk tactical missions. Likewise, the helicopter pilots were cross-trained as tactical officers increasing the capability of a tactical response to an emergency. Three helicopter pilots, P. Sahm, J. Turchetta, and P. Mullins (female) agreed to begin the specialized cross training as tactical officers. During this period the bureau relocated from its work space in the St. Louis County Emergency Operations Center to the recently constructed police helicopter hanger/office at the Spirit of St. Louis Airport.



Bureau of Tactical Operations, 1980s

Tactical Operations Unit - 1991 to Present: The name of the County Police tactical teams changed in 1991 from a bureau designation to the Tactical Operations Unit. However, this organizational title did not change the overall mission of the tactical teams. During this period the mission continued to include special weapons and tactics, crowd and riot control, execution of high-risk arrest/search warrants, policing high crime areas and special circumstances such as hostage negotiations and handling armed barricaded subjects. The tactical officers continued to serve as the honor guard and funeral escort for prominent public servants and provide dignitary protection during Presidential motorcades traveling in St Louis County and the city of St. Louis.

The Tactical Operations Reserves formed in 1983 was disbanded in 1991 due to the difficulty with maintaining the annual training for those police officers previously assigned to the unit. Reserve officers were required to attend all tactical and firearms training while fulfilling his/her current patrol or investigative duties. A similar situation occurred in 2014 with the Civil Disturbance Response Team. Participation in the required tactical and firearms training by the municipal police officers decreased each year due to commitments at their police departments. When the Metro Air Support Unit was established in 2004, the 1989 merger of police helicopter pilots and tactical officers was also discontinued. However, the tactical officers continued to utilize police helicopters to practice

rappelling techniques and short haul operations. The Metro Air Support Unit was created through a contractual agreement between St. Louis County, St. Charles County and the City of St. Louis.

Note: To learn more about the history of the County Police helicopter program see the report, “*Mountie One*,” located on the County Police web site.

The capability and performance of the Tactical Operations Unit improved considerably in 1998 when the County Police elected to become accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). Compliance with the 400 plus law enforcement standards strengthened the unit’s policies and procedural directives, increased the level of training, required vehicle maintenance/inventory schedules, and established a reporting system that permitted senior managers the ability to evaluate the unit’s performance each year. The CALEA compliance also required the adoption of emergency preparedness programs that address natural or man-made unusual occurrences. The recent remarks by former/retired Chief of the County Police, T. Fitch, best illustrates the value and impact the CALEA standards have on the performance of the unit. Chief Fitch said; *“The standards require operational readiness of the unit as well as their vehicles and equipment. Organizational structure, operational responsibility, team member selection standards and specialized training are also CALEA mandates.”*

The support role of the Tactical Operations Unit to respond to an emergency expanded in 2004 to include the city of St. Louis and St. Charles County. Although this regional support arrangement was not based on a formal agreement, the Missouri state law does authorize police officers serving in a “*County of the First Class*” to provide law enforcement support to another police agency facing an emergency that requires resources/expertise beyond its capability. When such a request is received, members of the Tactical Operations Unit have been designated as the first responders due to their high level of specialized training, emergency equipment and vehicles. A majority of responses have been criminal in nature such as an area search or manhunt for a suspect(s) who has managed to flee the scene of a criminal act. The unit has also led several multi-jurisdictional search and rescue situations attempting to locate a missing and endangered child or an elderly/disabled person. The non-criminal events that have required regional police cooperation and support by the Tactical Operations Unit have included the recent Presidential and Vice-Presidential debates, Veiled Prophet Fair, championship baseball series and large annual events like Mardi Gras held in the city of St. Louis. It is noted that the tactical officers participate in joint training with other State and Federal officers/agents focusing on potential large scale collaborative efforts including counter-terrorism scenarios.



Tactical Officer Patrol Vehicle

In 2000, the threat of an attack by a terrorist group using a “dirty bomb” was both a local and national concern. As a result, the U.S. government and federal investigative agencies encouraged the local police and fire districts, as first responders to weapons of mass destruction or hazardous material incidents, to expand their training and equipment to handle such attacks. With funding provided by a federal grant, tactical officers were trained and equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus to be able to secure a “hot zone.” In order to effectively respond to a hazardous incident, a Regional Hazardous Material Response Team (Region C) was established in 2000 with the fire service assuming the lead responsibility. Members of the regional response teams are from the police and fire departments in St. Louis County, St. Charles County and the city of St. Louis.

The mission of the unit was amended again in 2013 to increase the level of support provided to schools, businesses, and government installations following a series of high profile shootings across the nation. Tactical officers provide an in-depth security audit of the facility, the emergency response plans, and the level of training the staff has received.

Nearly all of the barricaded gunman incidents that have occurred in recent years have been handled by the Tactical Operations Unit, including those reported by the 59 municipal police departments. The capability of the tactical officers to successfully resolve a barricaded gunman situation has been well-established. Although the tactical officers serve all the high-risk warrants in the unincorporated area, only about 90 percent of the municipal warrants are referred to the unit for execution. The below chart summarizes the primary workload or performance data for the Tactical Operations Unit during 2013:

Unit Workload/Performance	2013
Barricaded Gunmen	17
Calls-for-Service	808
On-view Physical Arrests	288
Public Appearances	54
Search Warrants Served (County & Municipal)	184
Traffic Citations Issued	3,253
Training Instructor Hours	3,533

Today, the Tactical Operations Unit is commanded by a police captain and assisted by two sergeants, with one sergeant supervising the day shift squad and the second sergeant the afternoon shift. The three supervisors and 18 tactical officers maintain a 24-hour readiness alert level to meet the tactical needs of the County Police or a requesting municipal or federal police agency. The routine duty hours of the day shift are 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM followed by the afternoon shift working from 6:00 PM to 2:00 AM. In case of an emergency, the entire unit covers the non-duty hours (4:00 to 6:00 PM and 2:00 AM to 8:00 AM) through a call-back-to-duty schedule. If the emergency occurs in the unincorporated area, the tactical officers are supported by the uniform patrol officers assigned to a precinct. The patrol officers provide security at the perimeter of the emergency as well as control of the vehicle/pedestrian traffic. Each precinct patrol officer is equipped with a gas mask provided by the Missouri Police Chiefs Association using funding from a federal grant. The other equipment required for controlling a civil disorder situation is maintained at the precinct stations.

Compared to the special equipment issued in the early 1970s to each tactical officer, the equipment and accessories required today is much more extensive as well as costly. The chart below contains a list the key items of equipment that each member of the unit has to have available at all times, both

on or off-duty. Designated specialists within the unit would be required to maintain additional equipment such as tear gas (CS gas).

Ballistic Helmet	Detachable Gas Mask & Carrier
Eye and Ear Protection	Radio & Headset w/ 2 Batteries
Gloves and Knee Pads	5.56 mm Rifle w/ Red Dot Optic & Sling
Ballistic Kit/Heavy Vest	Sig Sauer Model 229 .40 Cal. Pistol
Tactical Gun Belt w/ Holster & Magazines	Taser™
Handcuffs	Hazmat Suit w/ Breathing Apparatus
Tactical Flashlights	Maritime Inflatable Tactical Vest
Night Vision Goggles	Distraction Devices



Tactical Equipment, 1990s

Training for a Tactical Response: Since its establishment in 1955, the County Police has fully participated in the specialized training offered by state and federal agencies, particularly those training opportunities provided by the FBI. Following the appointment of J. Edgar Hoover as Director, the FBI has since 1935 provided local police officers with the educational material and training sessions necessary to prepare for the ever changing law enforcement mission. For example, 50 years ago, in February 1965, the FBI published a comprehensive booklet titled the *“Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots.”* This booklet encouraged state and local police officials to participate in training related to controlling disorders. The FBI also encouraged police agencies receiving specialized training to provide the same training material for other police agencies in their jurisdiction. As the types of tactical incidents changed over the years the training courses offered by the FBI and other federal agencies were updated. An example of mission changes that have occurred in recent years involves the use of lethal and non-lethal weapons, responding to school/work place violence or gunman situations, search of methamphetamine labs and terrorist attacks.



Tactical Officer Training

The vintage training records maintained by the County Police reveal that police officers have taken full advantage of all basic and specialized training related to civil disorders and dangerous situations confronting state and local police departments. At the same time the County Police has offered basic and specialized training sessions for municipal police officers. The following chart provides a brief list of the types of tactical and civil disorder training received by County Police since 1967:

Dates	Subject/Course Title	Agency Sponsor
June 1967	Riot Control Training	Board of Governors for LE
February 1968	Riot Control	MO Peace Officers Association
May 1968	Tear Gas	St. Louis County Police
June 1968	Mob & Riot Control	MPC, Ft. Gordon, GA
March 1969	Civil Disorder-Prevention & Control	St. Louis County Police
April/May 1969	Crowd Control Formations & Baton Discipline	St. Louis City Police
October 1969	Gas/Smoke for Mob Control	Granite City Army Depot
1972	Urban Guerilla Warfare	FBI, St. Louis Field Office
1975/77	Hostage Negotiations	FBI, St. Louis Field Office
1975/77	Anti-Sniper Training	FBI, St. Louis Field Office
1985-1990	High Impact Physical Fitness	YMCA Brentwood
1999-2009	Bldg. Entries & Clearing Techniques	MPC, Ft. Leonard Wood, MO
1955-Present	FBI National Academy (Executive)	FBI, Quantico, VA
1968-Present	Dignitary Protection	U.S. Secret Service, Wash. D.C
1972-Present	SWAT, Anti-Sniper & Survival	FBI, Quantico, VA
2005-Present	Tactical Training	National Tactical Officer's Assoc.
2011-Present	Active Shooter/CDRT/MACTAC	Tactical Operations Unit



Tactical Officer Training

Upon establishment of the Bureau of Tactical Operations in 1973 there has been a requirement for each tactical officer to participate in annual mandatory training. The training has addressed special methods and techniques for managing each type of tactical emergency, while maintaining a high level of physical fitness and firearms qualification with both the hand-held pistol and specialized long weapons. Today, the officers are required to successfully complete six weeks of concentrated training. Four weeks of the training involves the entire unit and is administered using the team or squad approach. The remaining two weeks is devoted to individual training based on the officers' specific assignment in the squad. All vacations and other scheduling conflicts are canceled during the four training weeks to ensure full participation in each session. A typical training week could include hostage rescue techniques, removing a barricaded gunman, use of non-lethal devices, search warrant entry procedures and rappelling from the police helicopter. In addition, the unit has a requirement that each new tactical officer successfully complete the SWAT No. 1 and No. 2 course offered by the National Tactical Officers Association.

In February 2014 the St. Louis Area Police Chiefs Association supported a proposal to establish a unified civil unrest training program for all police officers in St. Louis County. This decision to provide county-wide training on the techniques and tactics used to quell a civil unrest also required abolishment of the previous Area-Wide Mobile Response Team. Because members of the Tactical Operations Unit had been successful for several years in coordinating "Active Shooter Response" training for County and municipal police officers, the unit was requested to prepare a similar course on controlling civil unrest. From March through May 2014 County Police tactical officers provided daily training in order to allow all police officers in the county to participate. This course of instructions included a half day on active shooter response and half a day on response to civil unrest. By providing such training, police officers were able to understand common police terminology and tactics required for the management of civil unrest. This tactical training was enhanced in 2015 with a new radio system that allows police officers from multiple jurisdictions the ability to communicate with each other. Due to the positive remarks received, the County Police continues to provide each year this specialized training program.

Tactical Operations Locations/Offices: The tactical operations function has been housed in four different locations since it was established in August 1973. Although tactical officers spend 90 percent of their time on executing high-risk search warrants, dignitary protection, special enforcement efforts, etc., there has been a requirement for a more secure facility to house the unit's special equipment and firearms, as well as specialized vehicles. Access to a secure office permits unit supervisors to conduct confidential briefings each day and hold roll call. The Tactical Operations Unit has been housed in four locations:

1973-1975	Page-West 2 nd Precinct, 11722 Administration Drive
1976-1978	Mobile Office Trailer, County Highway Department (Midland Blvd.)
1978-1989	St. Louis County Emergency Operations Center, 14847 Ladue Bluffs Crossing Drive
1989-Present	Spirit of St. Louis Airport, 18200 Edison Avenue

A Tactical Response to Serious Problems

Tactical officers have accepted numerous high profile and often difficult assignments since the first officer was assigned in 1973 to a police tactical team. As the reader will observe below, the mission has changed and even expanded over the years, as well as the types of incidents or tasks assigned. The following sections offer examples of a typical work day for a tactical officer.

Washington University/ROTC: The police records and newspaper articles from 1968 to early 1970 describe how a series of disturbances on the Washington University 10,000 student campus played a key role in preparing the County Police to deal with other tactical situations that occurred during the next 45 years. The first indication that there was a potential for student-led disruptions was noted during a January 1966 meeting with the County Police where the Vice Chancellor for Administration discussed *“problems related to student unrest, student demonstrations, and the like.”* The university wanted to prepare a course of action and to *“minimize the possibility of a more serious problem”* like those occurring at the University of California at Berkeley. In response, the County Police began receiving information on *“anti-establishment groups”* promoting student anti-Viet Nam war protests and unrest, especially calling for the ouster of the U.S Army and Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. During this period the university officials did not approve County Police detectives or other officers being on campus without a request from the university or the on-duty watchman.

Starting in 1968 there were numerous student protests and disturbances occurring on campus, including a failed attempt to fire bomb one of the ROTC buildings. In addition to anti-ROTC/U.S. military demonstrations, students disrupted meetings of the Board of Trustees and in other university buildings such as the Chancellor’s Office and Security Office. Security for the campus during this period was provided by private watchmen who had no law enforcement authority or police training. It was not until October 1969 that the private watchmen were replaced with officers deputized by the County Police.

The seriousness of the campus protests increased during March 1970 along with the number of students participating, ranging from 20 to several hundred at a protest. The protests included another attack on the Air Force ROTC building when students attempted to board up the building and attach condemned signs. The County Police responded and arrested nine students. At this point in time Superintendent of Police, R. J. di Grazia, reversed a previous agreement with the university



ROTC Building, Washington University

and directed that the detectives return to the campus to continue the investigation. The last of the major disturbances, with a crowd of 2,000-3,000 students, occurred when the Air Force ROTC building was destroyed by an arson fire during the early hours of May 6, 1970. Following this fire, the County Police increased dramatically the number of police officers reporting to the assembly area. At the end of the day on May 6 there were 84 County and 90 municipal police officers who had responded from their patrol beat assignments in an attempt to preserve order on the campus.

In one after-action report the County Police concluded that the ROTC arson fire may have been prevented if the department had been able to muster sufficient trained personnel more rapidly. The department also concluded that the police tactics used during the student demonstrations and burning of the ROTC building were the only tactics which could be successfully followed based on the situation. However, future student actions could cause a change in these tactics, e.g., guerilla type activities or wide spread campus vandalism perpetrated by small groups. There were no reports in the vintage files suggesting that the tactical teams established in 1968 responded to the campus demonstrations.

Three years following the campus disturbances, the County Police created the Bureau of Tactical Operations with tactical officers trained and equipped to respond to violent or dangerous incidents.

Shopping Centers/Malls: St. Louis County was experiencing a serious increase in the number of thefts, assaults and other criminal misconduct reported at certain shopping malls as well as on the parking lots during the Christmas/holiday shopping seasons of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In an effort to deter criminals from taking advantage of the crowded shopping malls, members of the Bureau of Tactical Operations were assigned each Christmas shopping season to three large malls located in the unincorporated area. The mission was to saturate the mall with marked police patrol vehicles and uniformed officers to discourage potential shoplifters and other offenders. Several members of the bureau worked in a plainclothes capacity making on-view arrests for theft, especially shoplifting and robbery suspects. Uniformed members from the Bureau of Reserve Police supplemented this effort by providing foot patrols within the shopping malls from 6:00 PM to 10:00 PM. As a result the three shopping malls began to experience significant decreases in criminal activity.

Untaxed Cigarettes: During the hot and humid summer of 1975 it was determined that the sale of untaxed cigarettes in St. Louis County had become a serious problem resulting in a tax loss of over \$500,000 annually. Not only was the sale of untaxed cigarettes a violation of the State law, the tax collected (5 cents per pack) supported the County Police budget. Under the direction of Sergeant J. Adams, several members of the Bureau of Tactical Operations participated in a five day project to seize untaxed cigarettes as well as the machines used to dispense the cigarettes. The effort was very successful in that the officers were able to seize 28 cigarette machines containing untaxed cigarettes, as well as perform six successful over-the-counter sales of untaxed cigarettes. During the five days the bureau checked 393 businesses and 282 machines. By the fourth day of the operation it became evident that the purpose of this special assignment had been accomplished as the number of machines found in violation became harder to locate. Several merchants advised that their machines had been serviced by the vendor just prior to the officers' arrival. The resulting publicity and enforcement effort caused the vendors and business owners to bring their machines and tax stamps into lawful compliance.

Coydogs/ Wild Dog Problem: During the winter of 1976 the residents of the Gravois Creek area in South County complained that wild vicious dogs or coydogs were jumping the residential fences and attacking their domestic pets (small dogs and cats). Numerous domestic pets had been taken by these wild animals. A major fear expressed by the residents was the safety of the small children living in the neighborhood. Under the supervision of Lt. J. Becker and Sergeant J. Adams, tactical officers assigned to



Coydog Assignment

the Bureau of Tactical Operations, in cooperation with the St. Louis County rabies personnel, successfully destroyed what were determined to be 20 coydogs. With aerial observation support from the police helicopter, the assignments lasted several days. Tactical officers worked each day from 5:00 AM to 1:30 PM and experienced deep snow, severe cold (9°F) and damp weather. Based on the success of the operation and the extreme weather conditions the tactical officers faced each day, the County Executive, Gene McNary, issued a personal commendation to each member of the unit. The coydog problem has not returned to South County. (As defined by Wikipedia, a coydog is a canid hybrid from a mating between a coyote and a dog.)

Firefighters Strike: The Bureau of Tactical Operations was assigned to act upon the instructions found in the July 25, 1977 State of Emergency order issued by the County Supervisor, Gene McNary. The order was based on the “*intolerable situation*” in University City (U City) where a building was allowed to burn to the ground because the firefighters did not respond. The 45 member U City Fire Department had been on strike for five days leaving the city without fire protection. The union firefighters had been ordered to return to work by a Circuit Court judge. Firefighters from other fire departments acting under mutual aid agreements had become intimidated and prevented from fighting any fire in U City. As a result the “*lives and property of the Citizens of University City and St. Louis County were in imminent peril.*” Based on the emergency order, the County Police began providing escorts for adjacent fire departments responding to emergencies in U City.

On July 27 the County Police was notified that the striking firefighters were blocking Delmar Blvd., the main street in U City, as well as Big Bend and Millbrook Boulevards. Blocking these main highways was causing a major disruption of commercial and private vehicle traffic. As a result U City had become paralyzed due to this action by the union firefighters. Tactical officers were directed to respond to both locations and order the firefighters to move off the roadway. The firefighters refused and the tactical officers, with the assistance of U



University City Firefighter's Strike

City police officers, took enforcement action which resulted in numerous arrests. As a result peace was restored to U City and vehicle traffic returned to normal at each location. The operational plan lasted one week with the tactical officers deployed over two shifts each day. If the firefighters had continued their strike, contingency plans had been approved allowing the County Police to obtain a fire pumper and train all tactical officers in basic firefighting techniques.

Abortion Clinic Arrests: During the late 1970s and the 1980s the St. Louis area was experiencing an increasing number of demonstrations against legally operated abortion clinics. The size of the groups picketing or demonstrating both inside and outside the clinic buildings continued to increase as well as the tactics used in an attempt to close or disrupt each clinic. The area around the clinics had been properly posted with "No Trespassing" signs. As a result the County Police was called to each demonstration, especially on Saturday mornings, to keep the peace, maintain order, protect private property, and enforce the laws and ordinances.

On April 19, 1986 the Bureau of Tactical Operations was contacted by the precinct commander requesting assistance at the abortion clinic located in the 13000 block of Manchester Road. The commander had received information that a large demonstration was planned following a national anti-abortion conference being held in St. Louis. The Manchester Road clinic was the anticipated target of this demonstration with the



Abortion Clinic Demonstrations

tactics used by the demonstrators to be escalated. Previous demonstrations included physical attempts to close the clinic by blocking the main door, hand-cuffing one or more demonstrators to the door, or physically blocking persons or customers from freely entering the building that housed three other non-related businesses.

The full complement of 17 tactical officers was activated and they reported to the location of the abortion clinic. When a large group of the demonstrators rushed forward to enter the building and disrupt the clinic, the tactical officers secured the entrance and allowed only those persons having a valid reason to enter the building. As a result of this action, the demonstrators sat down in front of the main door, locked arms, and refused to leave the private property after being legally directed to do so by a police officer. Assisted by uniformed patrol officers from the precinct, members of the Bureau of Tactical Operations arrested 104 protestors who were charged with trespassing. However, many of the arrestees resisted arrest by refusing to stand, falling limp, locking arms, etc. Another 100 activists picketed near the clinic in support of those arrested. Other protestors stood or laid in the roadway in an unsuccessful attempt to block the prisoner conveyance vehicles from leaving the scene of the arrests. As a result of the training, tactics and arrest procedures used by the tactical officers, none the persons arrested sustained any injuries. At the same time properly licensed businesses located inside the building were allowed to remain open.

Prostitution/Massage Parlors: The Bureau of Tactical Operation, under the leadership of Sergeant J. Lee, participated in a coordinated effort by the County Police to enforce prostitution violations occurring in 21 so-called massage parlors operating in the unincorporated areas of St. Louis County. The use of standard enforcement efforts were found to be ineffective in eliminating prostitution complaints or the number of parlors. In one legal effort the department supported passage of a 1974

ordinance that required each massage parlor to obtain a business license. The existing ordinances at the time did not require the 21 massage parlors to obtain a business or merchant's license due to the fact the "*parlors perform a service and do not sell a product.*" Criminal investigations conducted by the Bureau of Special Investigations, under the leadership of Detective Sgt. E. Clayton, determined that the majority of the parlors were operated by persons of questionable reputation who were using the parlors as a subterfuge for illegal sexual activities. It was also determined that a majority of the parlors employed known prostitutes as a masseuse knowing that they lacked any formal training.

Attempts to charge the violators with a criminal offense had not been successful as the Prosecuting Attorney's Office ruled that the types of sexual acts performed in the parlors were not a violation of the state law. Although the parlors obtained the required business license required by the new ordinance, the acts of prostitution continued as well as violations of the license regulations, e.g., closing times, health standards, employee arrest records, etc. The number of arrests and prosecutions continued but had little impact on the number of massage parlors offering acts of prostitution. Between 1973 and 1979 the problems associated with the massage parlors had not diminished. As an example, members of the public traveling in the 3000 block of North Lindbergh were complaining about females, wearing minimal clothing, being out each night on the massage parlor parking lots soliciting or flagging down potential customers who were driving by.

As a result of a coordinated enforcement effort between the bureaus of Special Investigations and Tactical Operations, the St. Louis County Counselors Office, and the St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney's Office (Mr. Buzz Westfall), by January 1982 all of the massage parlors in the unincorporated area had been closed. Detectives assigned to Special Investigations were successful in obtaining 109 warrants charging females with prostitution or related offenses. Tactical officers assisted by inspecting the parlors and employees for violations of the health Code regulations, sale of alcohol laws, and enforcing the required closing times. The County Counselor's Office was successful in revoking the issued business licenses used by the parlors to suggest they were a legitimate business. At the same time Mr. Westfall reported a 98 percent conviction rate for the prostitution arrests made by the County Police.



Buzz Westfall, Prosecuting Attorney



Tactical Equipment, 2013

High-Risk Arrest/Search Warrants: Since the establishment of the Bureau of Tactical Operations in 1973, the number of incidents across the nation where police officers were killed or injured while attempting to serve high-risk arrest or search warrants had become a serious problem. A national report found that 41 percent of the police officers killed during 1981 occurred while the officers were attempting an arrest. During this period detectives were responsible for serving their own search and arrest warrants. Experience had shown that the person to be arrested, or the occupants of the house or

apartment to be searched, did not immediately understand or accept that the plainclothes officer(s) banging on the door requesting entry were actually police officers. During the last several years the dangers associated with serving a search warrant at the location of a suspected “Meth Lab” created another danger to the arriving police officers.



Search Warrant Training, 1989

Because of this inherent danger, and the number of injuries and deaths, the County Police decided in 1983 to assign the execution of all high-risk warrants to the Bureau of Tactical Operations as the tactical officers had been trained on the techniques of building entries and arrest tactics. At the same time, the tactical officers worked in full police uniform and had access to specialized equipment necessary to successfully execute an arrest or search warrant, thereby reducing the potential of police officer or citizen injuries or death.

Should the violator decide not to cooperate, or a building or room had been barricaded to prevent execution of a warrant, tactical officers would be able to overcome the situation based on their training and expertise. The same building entry and clearing techniques used during a barricaded gunman assault are similar to the tactics necessary when serving high-risk warrants.

As a result of this 1983 mission assignment, tactical officers have successfully executed over 50,000 high-risk search warrants, including nearly all of those referred by a municipal police department. In recent years the service of arrest warrants by tactical officers has steadily decreased.

Hazardous Traffic Violations: The mission of the Bureau of Tactical Operations was again amended in 1988 in an attempt to reduce the number of hazardous driving violations occurring on the interstate system as well as the state highways. Tactical officers were assigned to specific sections of the highway system, especially during the hours of darkness, to issue citations to drivers

found speeding at least 20 mph over the posted speed limit. This short term enforcement effort resulted in a significant decrease in the number of hazardous traffic violations occurring and related vehicle accidents.

“Great Flood of 1993”: In addition to the routine tactical responses performed by the Tactical Operations Unit, the officers have been called upon to coordinate and assist during several manmade and natural disasters. The Great Flood of 1993 is just one example. The deployment of the unit began with an assignment to maintain security during the evacuation of the homes and businesses located in the Lemay area of South St. Louis County. When the Monarch Levee was breached on July 31, the unit was forced, due to the high water, to move its headquarters/office from the Spirit of St. Louis Airport (Chesterfield Valley). The St. Louis County Jail located near the airport was also inundated with floodwater and required an evacuation of all the prisoners. This evacuation and securing of prisoners from the jail became the responsibility of the tactical officers. Over 450 prisoners were conveyed to the North County Recreational Complex where a temporary detention facility was established under the supervision of the unit. During this assignment tactical officers maintained without incident security of the prisoners until a more permanent detention facility was located. The Great Flood of 1993 was unprecedented as to the total cost and economic impact on the community. The response by the County Police was also unprecedented, with the Tactical Operations Unit providing a significant part of that response.

President/Dignitary Protection: The Tactical Operations Unit has established an excellent working relationship with the U.S. Secret Service when assisting with the physical protection for the President, Vice President and candidates for this high office as they travel around the St. Louis area. The primary role of the unit during a Presidential visit is to manage and coordinate safety along the entire motorcade route through numerous political jurisdictions. This would include from the time of arrival at St. Louis-Lambert Airport to their destination and back to the airport. In addition, tactical officers serve as a *“reaction team”* capable of responding to a threat against the President or other protectees. The dignitary protection training provided by the U.S. Secret Service has allowed the tactical officers to provide personal security for other dignitaries conducting official business in St. Louis County. This list of dignitaries also includes religious leaders, foreign officials, senior military officers as well as others.



Chief R. Battelle; Pope John Paul II



President Ronald Reagan; Supt. G.H. Kleinknecht

The January 26-27, 1999, historic papal visit of Pope John Paul II to the St. Louis area is reflective of the roll of the Tactical Operations Unit during a dignitary protection assignment. The unit assisted the St. Louis City Police Department and the U.S. Secret Service in making the visit a success. Starting at Lambert International Airport, the tactical officers played a key role in the arrival of the Pope from Mexico. About 700 police officers from 60 area police departments provided security and crowd control during the Pope's visit starting at the home of Archbishop Justin Rigali, next to the Kiel Center for a youth rally, followed by a trip to the Trans World Dome for a mass and the New Cathedral for an ecumenical service.

Annual Uniform Day: In the spring of each year it has become a tradition of the County Police to designate one work day to permit employees to attend a memorial breakfast followed by a military style ceremony on the St. Louis County Government Plaza. What is informally known today as the Annual Uniform Day began 40 years ago when the Superintendent of Police determined that all police officers regardless of assignment or rank/title would wear their Class A uniform as a visual reaffirmation of their commitment to the law enforcement profession and in commemoration of those County Police officers who gave their lives in the line of duty. Not only does this day commemorate fallen officers, but the proud wearing of the brown police uniform is a visual attempt to recapture the spirit, enthusiasm and dedication evident on the first day of police service following graduation from the academy. Professional Staff members also participate and are encouraged to dress appropriately on this day.

Tactical officers have played a significant role in May of each year in the success of this memorial breakfast and plaza ceremony. These duties include serving as the Honor Guard along with the presentation and retiring of the colors and rifle salute. The plaza event continues today as a ceremony of pageantry, precision and emotion.



Annual Uniform Day

Barricaded Suspects: Probably the most dangerous response by a tactical officer is to an incident involving a barricaded suspect or barricaded gunman. The mandatory training as well as the available special equipment prepares the Tactical Operations Unit to resolve the situation without using deadly force. Normally, the incident involves a suspect who has committed a crime and is intent on avoiding arrest by taking up a defensive position while armed with a firearm, explosive or a dangerous weapon. As a result, tactical officers upon arrival are immediately faced with a potentially dangerous situation. Should the suspect resist arrest by continuing to barricade himself/herself, and the normal arrest procedures have been unsuccessful, the unit's trained negotiator will work with the suspect to accomplish a successful surrender. The unit also responds

to about 90 percent of the barricaded suspect incidents occurring in a municipality. It is estimated that the unit responds to 15 or more incidents involving a barricaded suspect/gunman each year.

Note: The Testimonials section of this report includes a review of the tactics used by the unit during an actual barricaded gunman situation.

MACTAC Active Shooter: In addition to responding to emergency situations, members of the Tactical Operations Unit began in 2010 providing an important training function for other police officers, fire personnel and the public. Under the leadership of the Tactical Operations Unit Commander, Captain Jon M. Belmar, this training covered how to handle violent incidents, a focus of public safety officer training for several years. The County Police has experienced these types of incidents in the past and will, inevitably, respond to such in the future.

Several tactical officers are qualified instructors who teach a program titled “*Multi-Assault Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC)*,” which is a comprehensive approach to training that covers the preparation, response, and aftermath of a mass casualty incident, such as an active-shooter in a school or a terrorist attack. The MACTAC training program has been customized to meet the unique needs of St. Louis County, namely the 59 municipal police departments and 45 fire departments/districts. A 40-hour train-the-trainer program permits each tactical officer to serve as a MACTAC instructor so all County Police officers would be trained. The use of vacant schools and businesses has provided an excellent work area for this type of specialized training.

Educate, Evade, Escape, Engage: As the unit was steadily increasing the training for handling mass violence attacks, Chief of Police T. Fitch determined in 2013 that the public should receive similar training. Tactical Officers M. Fumagalli and C. Zavorka, along with Captain S. Spear (Webster Groves, MO Police Department), developed a special program based on the Department of Homeland Security’s “*Run, Hide, Fight*” program, also called the 4E’s (Educate, Evade, Escape, Engage). Originally created by Tier One Tactical Solutions, the 4E program was loaned to the County Police at no cost. Since the start of the 4E training program, unarmed staff members from 10 public school districts and five private schools have been trained by members of the Tactical Operations Unit using both presentations and practical, hands-on scenarios. As a result of this community outreach effort, over 10,000 staff members from area schools, businesses and churches have been trained in methods and tactics for responding to a mass violence incident.



Tactical Operations Unit, 2015

Testimonials

"The Anti-War Protests"

Captain F. T. Crawford (Retired), DSN 574

The ability of the County Police to respond successfully to tactical emergencies has changed considerably since 1970 when I was a rookie patrolman assigned to First District working the afternoon watch. In the period February through April I remember listening to a series of police radio calls sending patrol officers to Washington University in response to the ongoing anti-war and anti-ROTC disturbances/protests.

On several days we were called from our patrol beats back to the First District station for roll call and briefings on the situation occurring at the university. After the briefing we were mustered into patrol police vehicles, conveyed to the campus, and assigned crowd and riot control duties. For all the officers it had become a stressful assignment as we had not been fully-trained on crowd control tactics; nor were we issued the personal protection equipment necessary when dealing with violent offenders. On the evening of February 27 we were standing in formation near Big Bend Blvd. and the Army ROTC building and the student/protester noise level had become overwhelming. It was very difficult to assemble enough officers to control the crowds that had gathered in every direction. As nightfall came, the students confronted the line of police officers I was assigned and taunted our reason for being at the university. On other nights we were pelted with rocks, bottles and fireworks. We were equipped with only plastic helmets, 40" night sticks and very limited training. There were no protective vests or shields, walkie talkies, or any sort of non-lethal weapons available (e.g., Taser™).

The County Police had assigned undercover detectives to the campus in an attempt to gather information about any upcoming student protests that were becoming more violent and causing property damage. A funny story was told about one detective who was in the commons area having lunch when his handcuffs accidentally fell on the floor causing alarm from the nearby students. As a result, he and his partner had to quickly retreat to their vehicle as the students began to chase them.

I remember when the Army and Air Force ROTC buildings were destroyed by an arson fire. In response to the Air Force fire, we assembled at the University City police station and were transported to the campus using prisoner buses borrowed from the Sheriff's Office. As we waited for the buses to arrive, the procurement officers opened wooden boxes and issued each of us a surplus military gas mask. The masks had "dry rot" and as we tried the masks on the rubber straps broke, one after another. When we arrived on campus the ROTC building was fully involved in fire. After the fire the number of protests seemed to dissipate.

"The First Female Tactical Officer"

Former Police Officer C. L. Carter, DSN 1047

Once hired and upon graduation from the police academy in 1972 I was one of the first females to be on patrol. I realized the uphill battle had begun; but I relished the challenge and welcomed the opportunity to have a positive effect on police work from the patrol level as a police officer who just happened to be a woman. All through field training and my probationary period, I recall citizens on the street, victims and even perpetrators, seemed to react favorably to a woman on patrol and treated me with respect. I was even more motivated, and aspired to gain even more experience and training with the County Police because I loved my job!

This walk down memory lane triggered some painful memories and reminded me of the negative environment to which the female officers in the 1970s were subjected on a daily basis from within the department. It almost seems in retrospect, the women officers were hired to fail. According to the official historical record and the university studies pertaining to the "experiment," the results seemed to be confidential even today. Fortunately, this did not derail the program of women in nontraditional roles, i.e., SWAT, helicopter pilot, supervisor, or bomb and arson detective. While on patrol in the First Precinct, I applied for a transfer to the Bureau of Tactical Operations several times. I was advised that the Lieutenant in charge refused to permit a woman in his bureau. After several years on patrol, I was pleasantly surprised to receive a transfer in 1976 to Tactical Operations. The SWAT team concept was new to the County Police and I was looking forward to the specialized training. It should be noted that on the first day I reported to the bureau, in front of the entire all-male squad, I was advised by the Lieutenant that no one would ride with me. After an awkward silence, much to the Lieutenant's dismay, two tactical officers stepped forward and stated they had worked with me in the First Precinct, so no problem now.

We trained often and I tried to make the best of a bad situation by learning all I could about special weapons. It was my job to place the tear gas projectiles inside a structure on command and to protect my team leader, up to and including the cost of my own life ... a job I readily accepted. I became proficient with the shotgun and my revolver ... I was even able to represent the County Police at the 1975-76 Police Olympics in Jackson, MS. My time in the bureau allowed me to participate in assignments as a tactical force in high crime areas in two-officer patrol cars. Our unit was very flexible, depending on the needs of the department. I went from hunting wild coydogs from a helicopter to assisting the U.S. Secret Service with protection of President Gerald Ford who landed at the St. Louis Lambert Field. I got to shake hands with a president!

Working in law enforcement is an education you could never purchase at the university. Fortunately, Officer J. Reifschneider, one of the guys who stepped forward that first day, became my partner. His mentoring and guidance allowed me to keep a positive mental attitude and persevere. It was an honor to work with Reifschneider. He was a Hero long before he died. Gender generalizations aside, as with any rookie, it takes time to build trust and working relationships, especially among first responders. I was encouraged that during my tenure, the officers I worked with rose above the negative attitude towards the first female assigned to the Bureau of Tactical Operations at that time. Time well spent.

"The Best Job I Ever Had"

Sergeant M. Panneri (Retired), DSN 1357

My transfer to the Bureau of Tactical Operations in 1980 was a great opportunity to serve not only the community, but the President of the United States and candidates seeking that high office. One of the missions of Tactical Operations is to provide dignitary or personal protection for high ranking government officials and other dignitaries. One of my first protection assignments was a visit by President Jimmy Carter during the Presidential campaign against Governor Ronald Reagan. The tactical team spent many days training for this type of highly sensitive and demanding assignment. The U.S. Secret Service agents also provided us training on all aspects of dignitary protection. Emphasis was on the importance of "perfection" in the execution of our duties. I recall one agent telling me: "You do not want to make history by being responsible for something happening to the President!"

Having been assigned to the patrol beat near the airport before joining Tactical Operations, my supervisor used my knowledge of the area and contacts with the St. Louis City Police, Highway Patrol and municipal police to coordinate dignitary visits. The Secret Service agents depended upon the local



President George H. W. Bush (dignitary protection)

police to secure motorcade routes as they neither had the personnel, time, experience nor marked police vehicles to accomplish that important task. The County Police had the reputation for being fully prepared to fulfill this responsibility as well as assisting with protecting the location of the visit. We worked as a team.

In addition to serving Presidents Carter and Governor Reagan, I was assigned to protect Vice President George H.W. Bush, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jim Baker, Donald Regan, among others. During each visit I had the

opportunity to personally meet with each of these dignitaries. I also had the honor of being assigned to providing personal security for Ms. Coretta Scott King during one of her visits to St. Louis. It was a privilege to have worked in such a great unit with such outstanding law enforcement officers in the best job I ever had!

"Professionalism and Dedication"

Police Officer S. McGuire, DSN 3645

My life and career as a law enforcement officer with the County Police quickly changed in July of 2011. I was joining a new family within the department that few officers, past and present, have been a part of. After participating in a tryout involving a physical fitness test, obstacle course, firearms qualification, and an interview, I was chosen to be a member of the Tactical Operations Unit.

Professionalism and dedication are the first two words that come to mind to help describe the Tactical Operations Unit. These two words are stressed on a daily basis among supervisors and teammates while we serve high-risk search warrants, arrest armed barricaded suspects and suicidal suspects from harmful situations, and provide dignitary protection for present and past government officials. The team also interacts with County residents by presenting special weapons and equipment at community events, conducts specialized patrols in high crime areas, and instructs fellow police officers and police recruits on tactics including active shooter events. These are just a few examples of what a tactical officer is tasked to complete on a daily basis; all completed with professionalism.

Dedication is being available 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. I dedicated over 3 years to the unit, and enjoyed every day of it in some way or another. The schedule for the team was stressful, but the reward I got from the experiences and lessons I learned outweighed that stress. Work and personal time were mixed together. A strong family support was vital due to the sacrifices that had to be made

for the multiple scheduling changes occurring on a daily basis. From the search warrants served early in the morning before the sun came up, to a long day of training, to executing a search warrant at different times during the day and night, to getting called out for a barricaded subject when I am putting my child to bed. Dedication was that look my wife gave me when my police pager went off at different times throughout the day or night. She knew it was important to me, the department, and the community to quickly respond to the emergency. Family support was a necessity, and I couldn't have done it without the dedication to the team by my wife and relatives. Several past, present and retired officers made several sacrifices needed for the success of our team. As a member of that team, you take pride in your position within the department, and that pride continues throughout your career.

I will never forget the good times, the bad times, and the times we went unnoticed. I will always consider the Tactical Operations Unit as my family, a family that I was gratefully chosen to be a member.

"A Barricaded Gunman"

Sergeant J. Pfanstiel, DSN 3047

In January 2007, the Jennings Police Department requested assistance from the County Police Tactical Operations Unit concerning an "armed, barricaded subject" located in the 8000 block of Orchard Avenue. The Jennings officers had responded to this address to investigate a "keep the peace" complaint. The suspect who had previous mental health issues refused to let the Jennings officers enter his home to conduct an investigation. The commander of the Tactical Operations Unit, Captain K. Frisz, responded to the scene and determined that the subject was extremely irrational and had displayed a firearm. As a result a full tactical response was initiated. I was a member of that response team and remember clearly being exposed to freezing temperatures on that January day during what resulted in a 20-hour barricaded gunman situation. However, we were each thankful for the sandwiches obtained from a nearby McDonald's restaurant.

Upon arrival we established a perimeter and our police negotiator, using a cell phone, was able to establish initial contact with the subject who was apparently barricaded inside his home. However, the attempts at negotiation failed and a "window breaker" munition was deployed to facilitate a response from the subject. After repeated attempts to make contact, our supervisor authorized deployment of CS gas as well as a flash-bang distraction device into the residence. Still, we received no response from the subject. We concluded he had traveled to another part of the house to avoid exposure to the effects of the gas. The tactical team I was assigned to moved up to the house in order to deploy additional gas canisters in another section of the house. As we were attempting to breach an exterior glass block bathroom window, the subject reached through a broken window above where we were positioned and began firing a pistol in our direction. One tactical officer returned fire before we egressed to a position of cover.

A decision was made to deploy the arson and explosives robot utilizing a water charge and 12 gauge rounds in an attempt to breach the bathroom window in order to use additional CS gas. This effort was also unsuccessful. Next, partial success was obtained when an explosive breaching charge was used on the bathroom window. This permitted the team to deploy CS gas into the bathroom, but to no avail. The same robot was deployed using a water charge to breach the front door in an attempt to locate the armed and barricaded subject. When the door was breached the subject fired six shots at the police robot. The robot survived. The next authorized tactic was to deploy a "throw phone" through a bedroom window at which time our police negotiator was finally able to re-establish contact with the subject. The negotiator finally obtained success by convincing the subject to drop his weapon and surrender peacefully to the tactical officers. This was the result our team had trained to achieve for each barricaded gunman call-out.

"The Wild Dog Caper"

Lieutenant R. Varner (Retired), DSN 1211

The winter of 1976 was the harshest weather experienced during my 40 years as a County police officer. Cold weather and snow came early and stayed for several weeks, from early November until late March. Well before this period a pack of wild dogs took up residency in a quarry area near Highway 21 and Green Park. It was believed that the wild dogs had already hunted the rabbits and other small game down to a minimum before the frigid winter set in. By late December and early January the residents in a nearby subdivision were reporting their small dogs missing from the yards. It was surmised by the homeowners and news media that the dogs living in the nearby quarry were the culprits. It did not take long for the news media to find a resident willing to go on camera and proclaim that school children at the early morning bus stop would be the next target of the wild dogs.

Efforts to trap the wild dogs by the St. Louis County Rabies control officers and agents from the Missouri Department of Conservation (MDC) were not successful, and the problem continued. The Bureau of Tactical Operations was asked to formulate a plan to stop the wild dogs in their tracks. Agents from MDC believed the wild dogs were in fact coydogs, that is half coyote and half stray domestic dog that had interbred with the pack. I saw the animals up close and they looked like coyotes to me. A plan was approved to hunt the dogs beginning the first week of January 1976. At the time the area outside the quarry was largely undeveloped. Following the plan, four campsites were set up in the area about ¼ a mile apart and manned by three to four tactical officers. The County Police helicopter would patrol the area where the dogs were living and notify the closest campsite when an animal was observed, and direct the tactical officers to the location of the animal.

For several days I worked this detail from 5:00 AM to 1:30 PM and experienced a temperature that never rose above 7 degrees. Each morning we began our tour of duty it was from 3 to 12 degrees below zero. My campsite was relatively comfortable in that we kept a bonfire burning all day. It was cold; and for that reason I was never eager to be notified of a "coydog" coming in our direction. After 10 days a total of 20 wild dogs or coydogs had been destroyed and removed from the area. This experience taught each tactical officer several lessons of survival when we worked outside during inclement weather.

"The Early Years"

Major L. Wadsack (Retired), DSN 695

During the early development years of the Bureau of Tactical Operations, I was fortunate to have served from April 1982 to October 1983 as the bureau director. I joined a well-trained and highly skilled group of police officers during an era that witnessed bureau's duties broaden in scope to include, for the first time, the centralized responsibility for the execution of all high-risk arrest and search warrants.

In the early 1980s this era witnessed an increase in illicit drug investigations, many of which were undercover operations resulting in the issuance of both felony arrest and search warrants. With the volume of search warrants involving drug houses on the rise, the County Police wanted an alternative to the risks inherent in allowing plain clothes detectives to execute search and arrest warrants on drug houses. The safe preference was for the warrants to be executed by trained uniformed officers so the entry team was plainly identifiable as police officers and not rival drug dealers. In addition, during this period tactical officers also supplemented patrol beat officers in response to local crime trends or other special needs, providing assistance during major events or natural disasters and assisting federal law enforcement agencies with dignitary protection. The bureau provided assistance to any municipal police department with a SWAT or other barricaded person incidents.

Many aspects of the planning and executing of high risk warrants were similar to the containment and entry techniques employed by the Bureau of Tactical Operations in resolving tactical situations. This new responsibility for the bureau is discussed in more detail in the December 1983 edition of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin in an article entitled "High-Risk Warrant Executions-A Systematic Approach." In sum, this move proved to be a good law enforcement strategy and provided tactical officers with the opportunity to perform functions for which they had been trained and equipped.

My most lasting impression of bureau experience was the amount of extensive tactical related training provided and the commitment by St. Louis County to purchase the specialized equipment needed to carry out the assigned missions. There is little doubt in my mind that the level, frequency and intensity of the training and the willingness to provide proper equipment contributed to the success of the bureau for all these years.

"Evolution of Tactical Operations"

Chief R. Battelle (Retired), DSN 380

The evolution of Tactical Operations began in the late 1960s and early 1970s and was centered around Viet Nam era protests manifested by the Washington University protests and the 1970 burning of the ROTC building. The civil rights and abortion protests across the nation as well as the environmental/dioxin protests in Times Beach (MO) also influenced the County Police in preparing for the future.

Initially, training for crowd control was conducted on a department-wide basis followed by specialized tactical training conducted at the firearms range. Specialized units were created (mostly on paper) and those officers assigned were subject to call out from their normal duty assignments. A used armored Brinks truck was procured to be a tactical vehicle. However, at the firearms range a decision was made to test the vehicle's "armored capability." A few rifle rounds were fired in the vehicle. The armor was pierced and the vehicle was subsequently scrapped. The next armored vehicle was purchased from the British in used condition and was called the "PIG." The "PIG" is no longer used as a tactical vehicle.



Tactical Vehicle "PIG," 1996

The Bureau of Tactical Operations became full-time in the mid-1970s and concentrated on saturation patrols and other specialized assignments as needed. The expertise of the unit was expanded in the 1980s and 1990s to include hostage and search warrant executions. Also, a big responsibility has been dignitary protection for the President and Vice-President of the United States, the visit of Pope John Paul II in 2003 and other government officials in conjunction with the U.S. Secret Service. Of course 9-11-2001 changed everything and expanded the responsibilities greatly to deal with terrorism threats, weapons of mass destruction threats, etc. The one constant throughout this entire period was the professionalism, character and integrity of all the tactical officers during this challenging period.

"Striving for Excellence"

Captain K. Frisz (Retired), DSN 2278

When I started as a patrolman with the County Police in 1986 and assigned to the North County Precinct, I became impressed with the police officers assigned to the Tactical Operations Unit. I had several occasions to talk with the officers about the unit and what they do on a daily basis. As a young officer it all sounded like a police unit I would like to be a member. .

I was able to get assigned to the unit in 1988 and spend the next ten years serving in that capacity. Like all units within our department, there is a constant evolution occurring. What I quickly learned about "Tact" was that it's all about striving for excellence, professionalism, and keeping the standards of the team high. What makes a unit like "Tact" so special is the team building, camaraderie, and bonding that occurs from the many hours of tactical training, physical training, and sitting in the tactical van waiting to execute search warrant after search warrant. It is difficult to understand the relationships formed in this unit unless you have had the opportunity to be part of the team. It is those relationships that permit the unit to succeed as a team and accomplish anything that comes its way.

The Tactical Operations Unit has always been this departments "catch all" unit. From presidential motorcades to traffic details, honor guards to funeral details, the tactical unit always takes steps to plan each and every detail to ensure it is handled with excellence. The mission capability of the unit expanded in 1989 when the police helicopter pilots were merged with "Tact" and began training as tactical officers. This also created the opportunity for me and another tactical officer to be trained as helicopter pilots. With its standards for excellence, the unit was able to continue to enhance how tactical missions are successfully completed while ensuring flight operations were completed with the same level of excellence.

I had the privilege of returning to "Tact" as the unit commander in 2003, serving in that capacity until 2010. Upon my return, it was reassuring to come back to a unit that still maintained the same high standards. The equipment was better, the officers were better trained and the unit continued accomplishing any mission assigned with a high degree of excellence. Commanding a unit like the Tactical Operations Unit is made easy when you have high caliber officers assigned to the unit.

"FBI SWAT Training"

Chief J. Lee (Retired), DSN 704

After the formation of the Bureau of Tactical Operations, the need to have the new tactical officers receive specialized training was obvious. For many years the FBI has offered a special weapons and tactics training course at their academy in Quantico, Virginia. Taking advantage of an FBI invitation, the County Police has sent several teams of five tactical officers each to receive this special training. As a young police officer assigned to Tactical Operations I had the privilege of attending this course in 1977. The training consisted both of classroom and practical instruction. Our instructors were all FBI special agents. The training day began every day at 8:00 AM and typically lasted until 7:00 or 8:00 in the evening.

Classroom training covered the history and operation of police type special weapons and tactics along with the makeup of a tactical team and functions of each team member. Practical training included physical training in the academy gym and at the outdoor training complexes (such as the rappelling tower). Emphasis was on the importance of working as a team as well as physical conditioning. There were a number of different tactical scenarios or exercises where the teams from different police agencies competed against each other. The exercises included running, completing an obstacle course, several firearms courses to include both revolver and rifle exercises. Also included were scenarios involving a large swimming tank as well as exposure to nighttime problems using the sniper tower. One

training day was devoted to combat village (a military type facility) where each team could practice building entry, building clearing and movement techniques.

This FBI training was certainly valuable in exposing my team to the police best practices from across the country and in identifying the types of training needed to maintain a well-trained and competent SWAT team. Following my tenure as a tactical officer, the bureau has evolved over the years in both sophisticated equipment is use and the highly skilled testing process for selecting prospective members.

“Results of a Tactical Plan”

Lt. Colonel J. Bader, DSN 2168

The Tactical Operations Unit frequently finds itself in situations that require the ability to adjust and adapt. The unit pretty much lives by the axiom that you have to adjust your tactics to the situation not the situation to your tactics. This was put to the test during a multitude of tactical call-outs. One such call-out was an incident that occurred on September 30, 1992 inside the emergency room at St. John's (Mercy) Hospital. A female armed with a shotgun appeared at the emergency room intent on killing her psychiatrist. As the incident unfolded the female was confined to the emergency admitting area and the unit responded to the scene.

I was one of the tactical officers who responded that day. The unit took up containment positions and attempted to open a dialogue with the armed female. She had her back against the wall between two elevators and could see anyone trying to approach from the other directions. It was difficult to maintain a visual as she could point the shotgun in the direction of any tactical officer she saw. Adding to the complexity of the situation was that her location denied access to the emergency room. The hospital staff adapted by routing incoming patients to other hospitals but this option was beginning to lose its viability. There was increasing pressure to resolve the incident quickly. The police negotiator made several unsuccessful attempts to convince the female to put the shotgun down.

At this point the unit had adjusted and managed to position a tactical officer that allowed a view of her actions. The initial report was she still had the shotgun but would occasionally lay it down on the floor. Two other tactical officers (T. Marr and K. Frisz) and I managed to obtain positions out of sight in an intersecting hall a short distance from the female. Based on this information a plan was developed wherein the tactical officer who was in a position to observe the female would advise when she was pointing the shotgun at the floor. Upon receipt of this information the officers in the intersecting hallway would deploy a "flash bang" device in the area occupied by the female. When she became disoriented by the "flash bang," the three officers would rush her location and attempt to disarm her. One tactical officer would have a ballistic shield, a second would go "hands on" to disarm the female, and a third (myself) would provide lethal coverage in the event the safety of the officers escalated to an unacceptable level. Once we as a small team began this planned tactic, other members of the unit would enter the area from outside the building to assist.

A short time later the observing tactical officer reported that she was pointing the shotgun at the floor. Based on the plan, at this moment the team deployed a "flash bang" and we sprinted toward the female. Although she momentarily lost control of the shotgun, she quickly recovered from the effects of the "flash bang" and began to swing the shotgun towards the approaching officers. Just as she was pointing the shotgun, we arrived at her location. In a span of time measured in fractions of a second the tactical officer with the ballistic shield crashed into the female while the "hands on" officer grabbed the end of the shotgun and deflected it from its intended line of fire. Responsible for providing lethal coverage, I observed these two simultaneous occurrences and determined that lethal force could be avoided. Within seconds the female was in custody and the scene secured. As they say, "timing is everything." Note: The female subject was admitted to the hospital for observation.

Of all the incidents the Tactical Operations Unit has been involved in over the years this one stands out as one of the more memorable for many reasons: A life was saved; the unit developed a workable plan with the variables given the members; and the absolute trust each tactical officer had for fellow members was on full display.

"Camaraderie"

Sergeant C. Higginbotham, DSN 3173

Serving with the Tactical Operations Unit was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life. To work with the very best officers and yet deal with the very worst situations requires a certain mindset, and you must perform at the highest possible level and you must do so at all times. The camaraderie that I experienced in the unit was extraordinary and that camaraderie allowed us to provide the citizens of St. Louis County with the quality police service that they deserve. It was a privilege and an honor to serve in the Tactical Operations Unit.

"The Home Front"

Tactical Officer J. Sparks, DSN 3813

"Well boys...it's as bad as we've ever seen it. We've lost the road; we've lost the block..." The Ferguson Police commander's voice trailed off before he quietly concluded, "There are no more Policemen down there." Those words seemed incredulous to me and the Tactical Officer's assembled nearby. What could he mean all of the policemen have gone? I asked myself that question already knowing the answer.

An uneasy silence settled over the Unit as we began to make out the sound of what was happening less than a block away. The protestors had become a mob causing the civil protests to quickly spiral out of control. Additional police officers and equipment were being requested from all over the region to respond as quickly as possible, but that was going to take time and it had become clear to all of us that we were out of time. Something needed to be done immediately and so The Tactical Operations Unit was ordered to take back West Florissant Avenue.

The use of ballistic tactical equipment had not yet been authorized and as such, we did what countless police officers have done before us. 17 of us grabbed a defensive baton and a plastic shield and headed down into what can only be described as complete mayhem. Darkness had fallen and the crowd had swelled and now numbered in the hundreds. Upon seeing the team's arrival, the crowd began running headlong into our position in a concerted effort to break the thin blue line that now stretched across West Florissant Avenue. The crowd surged into the Police line but quickly recognized our resolve and an uneasy standoff began. Though bricks, bottles and even bullets flew overhead the line still held. Every one of us knew that the Police line had to hold no matter the circumstances as the ramifications of failure were unacceptable. We simply could not fail... and we didn't. Eventually police officers from St. Louis County, St. Louis City, Highway Patrol and municipal departments began arriving from all over the area and started to re-enforce our position. The violent members of the crowd moved into the darkness and began a night of looting and burning that would turn the city of Ferguson, Missouri into an international headline.

This riotous event occurred on August 10th approximately 24 hours after the death of Michael Brown and would mark the beginning of a period of unprecedented civil unrest during which the Tactical Operations Unit would become involved in every major operation and effort in restoring peace. We in the Unit accepted that as long as we deployed into the most dangerous areas during the unrest then we could better protect all of the other Police Officers doing their very best to protect and serve a public who now seemed to have turned on them. Each Tactical Officer knew we were being asked to draw the

live fire of the most violent offenders in the most dangerous situations and we did so with quiet resolve...

After the violence had subsided and countless media personalities had packed up and gone, we came to realize that most of the sacrifices had been made at home. It is not as difficult as it might seem to understand and accept your own mortality when it comes in the service of others. We live a life of sacrifice but we sometimes forget what affect that life decision has on those who love us most. My wife and son's watched me come home for a few hours every day only to leave again as evening approached. Night after night they watched on the television as we were called on to hold back the actions of those who chose to embrace lawlessness and hate under the pretense of a lawful right to demonstrate. They knew that I was serving our community and that my calling was a dangerous one, but they had not anticipated the images that more closely resembled a theatre of war rather than a suburban U.S. town. In the end we were all changed forever and our Nation as a whole has changed as well. From this Tactical Officer's point of view some of those changes have been good and some have not. One thing remains clear however, no matter what the politics or circumstances may be when someone is called upon to take back the street...Tact will answer that call.

"Civil Unrest of 2014"

Chief J. Belmar, DSN 2337

The Tactical Operations Unit is known as a versatile work unit quickly able to adjust to a variety of tasks. This reputation was put on the line again and again in the days starting with August 9, 2014 and continuing for several months after that. On August 9 the Tactical Operations Unit was in the process of serving search warrants when they were advised of an officer involved shooting in the Ferguson area. Crime Scene units processing the scene advised that restless crowds were surrounding the scene and called for additional patrol cars to help preserve the scene. Arriving patrol units advised that the crowds were continuing to grow and in turn requested additional assistance. The Tactical Operations Unit, hearing the calls for assistance, completed their search warrant executions, changed into standard duty uniforms, and proceeded to the scene of the officer involved shooting.

Upon arrival the Unit immediately assessed the restlessness of the crowd and assisted in protecting the scene. Tactical officers also made contact with the members of the crowd in an attempt to calm them. Over the next several hours the crowd continued to grow and become increasingly restless. Several times during this period scene processing had to be halted due to gunfire in the area surrounding the scene. As the day came to an end the Unit held a debrief, discussed information available to them, and developed a plan for providing assistance if needed at a future time.

The next day quickly turned into an extension of the previous day as large, restless, crowds began to gather and make demands concerning information about the officer involved shooting. These crowds quickly overwhelmed on-scene resources and a request for assistance was made to the Tactical Operations Unit. The Unit responded and assisted in attempts to calm the crowd and restore order to the gathering. These efforts proved futile as the crowd turned violent towards the officers on the scene. In the span of a few minutes the violent crowd overwhelmed officers on the scene and "officer in need of aid" calls started to flow into communications. Faced with hostile crowds and pinned down officers the Unit adjusted their purpose from one of assisting on-scene units with managing a crowd to one of "rescue and recovery. As the best equipped and trained officers on the scene the Unit immediately began to respond to "aid" calls for both officers and citizens. Over the next several hours Tact officers inserted themselves into the very center of the hostilities to extract officers and citizens unable to escape the mayhem. As the size and violent nature of the crowd continued to grow the Unit concluded rescue and recovery operations and assumed the role of crowd management. Utilizing the tools and

personnel within their Unit they directed the activity of personnel arriving on the scene to provide assistance.

The role of the Unit continued to evolve over the next several days and into the weeks and months that followed. The Unit continued to provide assistance with crowd interaction, conduct rescue and recovery operations, and coordinate on-scene personnel. In short order the Unit was also tasked with providing various types of training to each officer responding to provide assistance. Amazingly, the Unit handled each of these tasks and still managed to complete the tasks normally assigned to them. The fact that many times these activities, and others, were all performed in the same day illustrates the true versatility of the Tactical Operations Unit.

Frequently people ask how and why the Unit ended up in the middle of the Civil Unrest of 2014. Although the reasons are many, the answer is simple. They were the best option available to fill an ever evolving task with the greatest potential for success. The Unit's ability to adjust, adapt, and fill a variety of roles on short notice made them an ideal candidate to fill a need to resolve an issue whose nature changed on a daily basis.

Use of Special Tactical Vehicles

When the Bureau of Tactical Operations became operational in 1973 it had access to a command post for managing responses to emergencies or other major events, e.g., civil disorder, barricaded gunman, etc. The command post consisted of a small used mobile trailer jointly renovated and equipped by the County Police and the Department of Highways and Traffic. The special equipment and capability of this trailer was limited, basically a small office equipped with a power supply and limited radio and telephone service. Forty years later, however, the Tactical Operations Unit has available four major pieces of mobile equipment capable of supporting the various missions of the unit:

BEAR: The BEAR (Ballistic Engineered Armored Response) tactical vehicle was purchased in 2001 from the Lenco Armored Vehicles Company using \$170,000 from the asset forfeiture fund. This is a two-wheel drive armored vehicle designed to physically protect tactical officers during an assault or rescue situation.



Tactical Vehicle "BEAR"

BEARCat: This armored tactical vehicle was acquired in 2012 using an Urban Area Security Initiative grant from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It was also built and designed by the Lenco Armored Vehicles Company and is capable of performing functions not possible using the BEAR. For example, an elevated platform permits tactical officers to enter the third floor of a building. The four-wheel drive feature of the BEARCat allows the vehicle to travel off road and traverse rugged terrain.



Tactical Vehicle “BEARCat”

Equipment Truck: The Equipment Truck is organized and equipped to serve as both a command post and large equipment vehicle. Built by Farber Specialty Vehicles, the truck was purchased in 2012 using a \$268,393 grant from DHS. The available specialized items include computers, CCTV and HazMat equipment. Other classified equipment housed in the truck allows tactical officers to manage several types of sensitive emergencies.



Tactical Equipment Truck

Search Warrant Van: This special vehicle supports the unit when executing high-risk search warrants by safely transporting tactical officers, along with their special equipment, to the location of the premises to be searched. As the majority of the search warrants are related to criminal acts involving illegal drugs/narcotics, the use of force by the team is often necessary to gain entry as the premises (doors) are typically fortified. The Dodge Sprinter van was equipped by Commercial Van Interiors at a cost of \$13,804 from the asset forfeiture fund.



Tactical Search Warrant Van

Although under the control of the Office of Emergency Management, tactical officers have access to a large command vehicle (motor home format) purchased in 1994 using \$250,000 in asset forfeiture funds. This mobile command vehicle was designed and equipped by LDV, Inc. to handle emergencies that require coordination by several government agencies, e.g., storm/tornado, major flood or airplane disaster.

Looking Forward

An important question facing the County Police in the near term will be how to successfully manage a community-oriented policing initiative (police /public partnerships) while at the same time train and equip the department for a tactical response to an emergency, e.g., terrorist attack, barricaded gunman, or an incident of violent civil disorder. As in the past, the missions assigned to the Tactical Operations Unit will be revised periodically as the emergencies facing our community evolve. This will include obtaining sophisticated/specialized training and equipment necessary to manage complex and dangerous incidents. Preparing for the future, based on past experience, will require increasing the number of trained and equipped tactical officers to be "*subject matter experts*" in preventing acts of civil disobedience from escalating to the point where persons are injured or property is damaged. At the same time new tactics and strategies will have to be adopted for each type of emergency.

Terrorist activity and attacks against our public institutions and government officials are serious problems for future concern. Across the nation these types of incidents are reported almost daily. As the designated first responders, the "homeland security" mission of the County Police will require the expertise and staff necessary to conduct "threat assessments" – the ability to determine whether a threat against a place or a high profile person is legitimate or not. An expansion of the unit's terrorism mission will also require an investment in specialized training as well as new technology and equipment.

As an alternative to assigning tactical responses to the County Police, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or the Missouri National Guard may assume this authority for handling violent acts of civil disobedience and/or terrorist activity. A more responsive approach might be the establishment of an expanded tactical response unit made up of county and municipal police/fire officers with the authority, staff and equipment capable of handling all emergencies that occur in St. Louis County. Whatever the future requires of the unit, the tactical officers will be ready to perform at the highest level due to their training and commitment to bring peace to the community.

“On the home front, we will continue to take every lawful and effective measure to protect our country. This is our most solemn duty.”

President George W. Bush



BIBLIOGRAPHY/RESOURCE

Dorrough, Bernell. "Campus Riots Targeted ROTC," Student Life, Washington University, April 7, 2001.

Hoover, Director John Edgar. Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots. Federal Bureau of Investigations, U.S. Department of Justice, February 23, 1965.

Katzenbach, Chairman Nicholas. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1967.

Kerner, Chairman Otto. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1968.

Kleinknecht, Superintendent G.H., and Major G.O. Mizell. "Abortion-A Police Response." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, March 1982.

O'Connor, Director George W. Civil Disorders, After Action Reports. Professional Standards Division, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Spring 1968.

Wadsack, Lieutenant L. "High-Risk Warrant Executions-A Systematic Approach," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, December 1983.

St. Louis County, MO Police Department. Files of the Supt. (Chief) of Police: 1955-1990.

St. Louis County, MO Police Department. Annual Reports, 1955-2014.

St. Louis County, MO Police Department. General Orders, Special Orders, Manuals: 1955-1990.

The St. Louis Globe-Democrat. Related newspaper articles: 1969-1975.

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Related newspaper articles: 1969-1990

Appendix A

“The Proud Ones”

<i>Current and Former Tactical Officers Who Honorably Served Since 1973*</i>

J	ABELOV	F	DURRELL	A	JONES	P	MULLINS	J	SMITH
J	ADAMS	K	DYE	J	KAPAYOU	R	MUNDY	J	SPARKS
R	ANGARITA	A	EICKHOFF	B	KELLING	S	MURLEY	C	STEIB
B	ARMFIELD	D	ELZE	R	KENNEY	S	MURPHY	J	STEINMETZ
J	BADER	D	FLYNN	D	KITREL	J	NEUMAN	M	STEINMETZ
D	BARRON	K	FRISZ	T	KLEKAMP	J	NOWOTNY	T	STOECKLIN
R	BATES	C	FOPPE	G	KROEGER	M	PANNERI	M	STOYANOV
R	BATTELLE	R	FUMUGALLI	S	LAKEY	J	PARNAS	L	STULCE
J	BECKER	M	GARTLAND	J	LEE	R	PAUL	T	TANNER
T	BECKER	C	GIBBS	C	LEHMAN	G	PEREZ	S	TARPLEY
J	BELMAR	D	GLENN	T	LEY	J	PFANSTIEL	M	TAYLOR
K	BERRA	J	GRACE	G	LOHR	T	PIERCE	J	TIERNAN
J	BLAKE	L	GRANT	D	LOTTMANN	M	PINTO	R	TRITTLER
J	BRANDT	J	GRAVES	B	LUDWIG	M	PLEVIK	J	TURCHETTA
S	BROWN	K	GREGORY	J	MARCUM	A	POINDEXTER	R	VARNER
R	BRUSCA	D	GROTE	D	MARQUITZ	E	PRIAUIX	D	VENTIMIGLIA
M	BURNS	W	GROVERO	T	MARR	D	PUDLOWSKI	T	VOHSEN
M	CALLAHAN	T	HAGERTY	J	MARTIN	J	QUENTIN	L	WADSACK
J	CANTRELL	L	HANEBRINK	M	MCCANN	J	QUINN	D	WALZ
M	CARAVELLA	A	HARDING	T	MCCOY	M	RAINWATER	J	WEBB JR
D	CARROLL	W	HARLAN	J	MCCRADY	J	REHAGEN	R	WELLS
B	CARTER	M	HAUCK	M	MCDONALD	J	REIFSCHNEIDER	B	WHALEN
C	CARTER	R	HAYES	M	MCFARLAND	J	RILEY	R	WHALEY
G	CORLESS	B	HESSLING	S	MCGUIRE	R	RIZZUTI	J	WHEELER
K	COX	K	HEYER	M	MCINTOSH	T	ROBERDS	M	WHITSON
E	CRENSHAW	C	HIGGINBOTHAM	S	MELIES	J	ROMO	D	WIESE
G	CREWS	J	HILDEBRAND	R	MELTON	J	ROSENTHAL	W	WILHELM
C	CRIVELLO	J	HOGAN	T	MEYER	J	ROUSSIN	A	WILLIAMS
T	CULIAN	J	HOGG	R	MIDKIFF	S	SACK	K	WILLIAMS
D	CUNNINGHAM	M	HUTCHERSON	G	MILLER	P	SAHM	G	WILSON
M	DIERKES	T	HYLLA	K	MINOR	K	SCHMELIG	L	WINTERS
J	DITE	T	JACKSON	M	MOERSCHHELL	D	SCHMIDT	K	WISDOM
D	DOCTER	G	JACOBSEN	M	MONTELEONE	J	SCHNEIDER	S	YARBROUGH
L	DOROUGH	S	JEFFERSON	M	MOORE	D	SEYMOUR	C	ZAVORKA
D	DUNMIRE	R	JENNE	R	MOORE	G	SMITH	T	ZINSELMIEER

**List prepared and maintained by the Tactical Operations Unit.*

NOTES